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SWISHER v. BRADY: DOES A JUVENILE COURT REHEARING
ON THE RECORD AFTER A MASTER HAS MADE PROPOSED
FINDINGS VIOLATE DOUBLE JEOPARDY OR DUE PROCESS?
INTRODUCTION

In a series of decisions beginning with the landmark case of In re Gault,1 the
Supreme Court has held that many of the constitutional guarantees that protect
the rights of adult defendants in criminal cases extend to juvenile court
proceedings. 2 Among the guarantees the Court has found applicable under
certain circumstances is the fifth amendment protection against double jeopardy, as incorporated into the fourteenth amendment.3
This right was again at issue in Swisher v. Brady,' brought to challenge a
feature of juvenile proceedings in Maryland. In the Maryland system' masters,

1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528 (1971); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975). See text accompanying notes 52
to 72, 133 to 153 infra.
2. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (double jeopardy); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970) (reasonable doubt standard required for conviction); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
(notice of charges; counsel; confrontation and cross-examination; privilege against
self-incrimination; transcript of proceedings; appellate review).
3. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975). U.S. CONST. amend. V reads in relevant part:
"[Nior shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb ....
" The double jeopardy clause is applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
4. 438 U.S. 204 (1978).
5. The system described here is in force throughout the state, except for two
counties. See note 196 infra.
6. As early as 1902, Maryland law provided for a special judicial officer, a Baltimore
City "Magistrate for Juvenile Causes," to handle juvenile matters. After a study of the
treatment of juvenile delinquency in Maryland in the early 1940's, jurisdiction of the
Circuit Court of Baltimore City was extended to juvenile causes by Chapter 818 of the Acts
of 1943. Ch. 818, 1943 Md. Laws 1445. See In re Anderson, 272 Md. 85, 94-97, 321 A.2d
516, 521-23, appeal dismissed sub nom. Epps v. Maryland, 419 U.S. 809 (1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975).
That act provided for the appointment ..
of"a suitable person to act as Master." The
Master was required at the conclusion of a hearing to "transmit to the Judge all
papers relating to the case, together with his findings and recommendations in
writing," with the further proviso that if no hearing were requested relative to those
findings and recommendations they should, "when confirmed by an order of the Judge,
' ' *become the judgment of the court."
Id. at 96, 321 A.2d at 522.
The title of "master," originally "master in chancery," indicates the subordinate
position of the office. Although the duties assigned to positions so named have ranged from
strictly ministerial clerical tasks to more responsible work such as the hearing of evidence
and the preparation of proposed decrees, they have not included strictly judicial functions,
and have not been free of court supervision. See id. at 101-04, 321 A.2d at 525-27; E.
MILLER, EQUITY PROCEDURE AS ESTABLISHED IN THE COURTS OF MARYLAND §§ 555, 556
(1897). But see note 48 infra. After 1943 the use of juvenile court masters was introduced
in most counties of the state, with masters exercising their functions there, as in
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are authorized by a rule of procedure to hear cases assigned to them by the
juvenile court and render proposed findings and recommendations, which may
be accepted, modified, or rejected by the juvenile court judge.7 The state may file
exceptions to a master's findings, and if it does so, a hearing on the record is
held before the judge.' In Swisher the Supreme Court ruled that the hearing
held upon the state's taking of exceptions does not require an accused to stand
trial a secotid time, and therefore does not violate the double jeopardy clause.9
The proceedings before the Court in Swisher represented the culmination of
a series of state and federal court challenges to the juvenile master system on
double jeopardy grounds. In 1972, a Baltimore City master concluded, after a
hearing, that the state had failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that
William Anderson, a juvenile, had assaulted and robbed a woman."0 The state's
attorney filed exceptions to the master's findings and requested a de novo

Baltimore City, under the juvenile jurisdiction of the circuit courts. 272 Md. at 96-97, 321
A.2d at 522-23.
7. Maryland Rule of Procedure 911 authorizes masters to order detention or shelter
care of juveniles, subject to a judge's immediate review if requested, MD. R.P. 911(a)(1),
and to hear cases and matters assigned by a court except hearings on petitions for waiver
of juvenile jurisdiction, id. 911(a)(2). It specifically provides that masters' findings and
recommendations do not constitute final orders of the court, id., and makes the following
provisions for review of masters' findings:
b. Report To The Court
Within ten days following the conclusion of a disposition hearing by a master, he
shall transmit to the judge the entire file in the case, together with a written report of
his proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, recommendations and proposed orders
with respect to adjudication and disposition .
c. Review by Court if Exceptions Filed
Any party may file exceptions to the master's proposed findings, conclusions,
recommendations or proposed orders. Exceptions shall be in writing, filed with the
clerk within five days after the master's report is served upon the party, and shall
specify those items to which the party excepts, and whether the hearing is to be de
novo or on the record....
Upon the filing of exceptions, a prompt hearing shall be scheduled on the
exceptions. An excepting party other than the State may elect a hearing de novo or a
hearing on the record. If the State is the excepting party, the hearing shall be on the
record, supplemented by such additional evidence as the judge considers relevant and
to which the parties raise no objection. In either case the hearing shall be limited to
those matters to which exceptions have been taken.
d. Review by Court in Absence of Exceptions
In the absence of timely and proper exceptions, the master's proposed findings of
fact, conclusions of law and recommendations may be adopted by the court and the
proposed or other appropriate orders may be entered based on them. The court may
remand the case to the master for further hearing, or may, on its own motion,
schedule and conduct a further hearing supplemented by such additional evidence as
the court considers relevant and to which the parties raise no objection ..
Id. 911(b)-(d).
8. Id. 911(c).
9. 438 U.S. at 219.
10. Id. at 207.
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hearing, as provided by the then applicable rule." Anderson responded with a
motion to dismiss the notice of exceptions, arguing that the provision for a de
novo hearing violated the double jeopardy clause. The juvenile court granted the
motion,'2 and subsequently granted the same relief to several similarly situated
juveniles, including those who later initiated the Swisher litigation.'"
The state appealed the cases of Anderson and three other juveniles, and the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed." The four juveniles appealed, and
the Court of Appeals affirmed.'5 Two of the appellants, joined by seven other
juveniles, in November 1974 initiated a class action in the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland under the federal civil rights
statute.'6 They sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the

11. Id. At the time the exceptions were filed, MD. R.P. 908(e) (1971) governed the use
of masters in Maryland juvenile proceedings. It differed from current rule 911, see note 7
supra, in that it provided for a de novo hearing, rather than a hearing on the record, if the
state took exceptions. Rule 908(e) was amended as of July 1, 1975, and became rule 910. 2
Md. Reg. 969-70 (1975). After a subsequent amendment, effective January 1, 1977, the
provision was renumbered as rule 911, 3 Md. Reg. 1385 (1976). See notes 24 to 30 and
accompanying text infra.
12. The judge ruled that double jeopardy protections apply to juvenile court
proceedings, 438 U.S. at 207-08, and that the de novo hearing upon the state's taking of
exceptions violated those protections, id. at 208. The opinion antedated the Supreme Court
decision in Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), which extended double jeopardy protection
to juveniles. Maryland case law in 1973 rejected the notion of double jeopardy protection
for juveniles, because it was held that juvenile courts did not punish for the commission of
crimes. See Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524, 140 A.2d 914 (1958); Johnson v. State, 3 Md.
App. 105, 238 A.2d 286 (1968). See also note 55 infra.
13. 438 U.S. at 208.
14. In re Anderson, 20 Md. App. 31, 315 A.2d 540, affd, 272 Md. 85, 321 A.2d 516,
appeal dismissed sub nom. Epps v. Maryland, 419 U.S. 809 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1000 (1975). Assuming for purposes of its decision that jeopardy attached at the
commencement of the hearing before the master, the court held that "there is no
adjudication by reason of the master's findings and recommendations." Id. at 47, 315 A.2d
at 549 (footnote omitted). Thus, "the hearing, and the jeopardy thereto attaching,
terminate only upon a valid adjudication by the juvenile judge." Id. (emphasis in original).
In the court's view, a de novo hearing in this context was not a second exposure to
jeopardy, but "merely a continuance of the hearing and the initial jeopardy." Id. See note
72 and accompanying text infra.
15. In re Anderson, 272 Md. 85, 321 A.2d 516, appeal dismissed sub nom. Epps v.
Maryland, 419 U.S. 809 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975). Unlike the Court of
Special Appeals, which assumed that jeopardy attached at the beginning of the master's
hearing, the Court of Appeals held that "a hearing before a master is not such a hearing as
places a juvenile in jeopardy." Id. at 106, 321 A.2d at 527. In the court's opinion, a master
was merely a ministerial and not a judicial officer. Id. But see Bris Realty Co. v. Phoenix
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 238 Md. 84, 208 A.2d 68 (1965) (rejecting argument that master not
judicial officer). Since his findings did not become binding until approved by the juvenile
judge, double jeopardy could not arise if the matter was heard de novo before the judge.
272 Md. at 106, 321 A.2d at 527. An appeal to the Supreme Court by some of the minors
was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. Epps v. Maryland, 419 U.S. 809
(1974). The Court later also denied certiorari. 421 U.S. 1000 (1975).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). A three-judge court was convened, under 28 U.S.C. § 2281
(1976), to hear the matters. Brady v. Swisher, 436 F. Supp. 1361 (D. Md. 1977).
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future operation of the rule on the ground that by permitting a second trial
before a juvenile judge, it violated the double jeopardy clause. The juveniles also
sought federal habeas corpus relief, contending that they had been unjustly
deprived of their liberty as a result of the de novo hearings, which violated their
rights under the double jeopardy clause."
The district court judge considering the habeas corpus petition ruled that
the provision for a de novo hearing on the state's exceptions violated the double
jeopardy clause, and granted relief.'8 In contrast to the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, 9 the court held that a juvenile is placed in jeopardy as soon as the
0
state begins to offer evidence in an adjudicatory hearing before a master. The
court found that a de novo hearing before a judge places the juvenile in jeopardy
a second time because it requires him to "'[marshal] his resources against those
of the State' "2lfor a second time, and "twice [subjects him] to the 'heavy
'2
personal strain' which such an experience represents. The court noted that in
reaching its decision it was bound to consider the substance as well as the form
of Maryland juvenile proceedings."
Before this decision, the Maryland General Assembly had enacted legislation providing for the first time a statutory basis for the use of masters in
juvenile court proceedings. 4 The new statute differed somewhat from the rule by
providing that either party, not just the state as under the rule, was authorized
to file exceptions to a master's findings and could elect a hearing on the record
or a de novo hearing before the judge. ' The statute further specified that the

17. Aldridge v. Dean, 395 F. Supp. 1161 (D. Md. 1975). A single judge was designated
to review the habeas petitions, and consideration of the class action was stayed pending
his determination. Brady v. Swisher, 436 F. Supp. at 1362-63.
18. Aldridge v. Dean, 395 F. Supp. at 1172-73. The petitions of three of the nine
juveniles were dismissed without prejudice because they had not yet been brought before
the juvenile judge.
19. In re Anderson, 272 Md. 85, 321 A.2d 516, appeal dismissed sub nom. Epps v.
Maryland, 419 U.S. 809 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975).
20. 395 F. Supp. at 1172. Criticizing the Court of Appeals' position, Judge Thomsen
queried:
If this be the law of Maryland, when is a juvenile placed in jeopardy in the
ordinary case, where the only hearing is before the master and the judge reads a
printed form of report. . . without any factual details, and signs his name below the
words "Approved and So Ordered"?
Id. at n.25.
21. Id. at 1173 (quoting Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 533 (1975)).
22. Id. (citations omitted).
23. Id. at 1169. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967); see notes 55 & 90 and accompanying text infra.
24. Ch. 554, 1975 Md. Laws 2670 (codified at MD. CTS. & JuD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 3-813(1980)).
25. MD.CTS. & JuD. PRoC. CoDE ANN. § 3-813(c) (1980). Subsection (c) provides:
Any party, in accordance with the Maryland Rules, may file written exceptions to
any or all of the master's findings, conclusions, and recommendations, but shall
specify those items to which he objects. The party who files exceptions may elect a
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"proposals and recommendations of a master for juvenile causes [did] not
constitute orders or final action of the court."' After its enactment, on the day
before the habeas corpus decision, the Maryland Court of Appeals promulgated a
new rule governing the use of masters, 7 which paralleled the new statute. Two
weeks later a revised Version' was published, to take effect on the same date as
the statute.' Rule 911, currently in force, differs from the statute in that it
labels as "proposed" the master's findings of fact. In addition, it only gives the
state the power to secure a hearing on the record, not a de novo hearing. The
juvenile, after filing exceptions, can elect either. The judge may hear additional
relevant evidence to which neither party raises objection. 0
When rule 911 took effect, the juveniles amended their class action
complaint to include it. The three-judge panel certified the plaintiff class to
include all juveniles against whom the State of Maryland had filed exceptions to
findings of non-delinquency.3 1 In a unanimous opinion, the court held the statute
and rule 911 unconstitutional,32 noting that "[t]he most important element is
that the State has more than one opportunity to convince a trier of fact of the
guilt of the juvenile." The district court enjoined the state from taking
exceptions to either a master's finding of non-delinquency or his proposed
disposition.-"
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction" "solely to determine
whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits state officials, acting in
accordance with rule 911, from taking exceptions to a master's proposed

hearing de novo or a hearing on the record before the court. The hearing shall be
limited to those matters to which exceptions have been taken.
26. Id. § 3-813(d). Subsection (d) further provides that the findings "shall be promptly
reviewed by the court, and in the absence of timely and proper exceptions they may be
adopted by the court and appropriate orders entered based on them." Id.
27. 2 Md. Reg. 909-12 (1975) (proposed MD. R.P. 910).
28. 2 Md. Reg. 969-70 (1975) (proposed MD. R.P. 910).
29. 2 Md. Reg. 967 (1975); ch. 554, § 5, 1975 Md. Laws 2670 (effective July 1, 1975). A
1976 amendment resulted in the renumbering of the rule as rule 911. 3 Md. Reg. 1385
(1976).
30. MD. R.P. 911.

31. Brady v. Swisher, 436 F. Supp. 1361, 1362 (D. Md. 1977). Certification was
granted under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
32. The court noted that the statute and the rule were in conflict as to whether the
subsequent hearing is to be de novo or on the record, and pointed out that "[u]nder
Maryland case law, a rule which conflicts with a statute will prevail if it was adopted
subsequent to the passage of the statute and is within the rule-making power of the
Maryland Court of Appeals." 436 F. Supp. at 1365. See County Fed. Sav. & Loan v.
Equitable Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 261 Md. 246, 253, 274 A.2d 363, 367 (1971). The statute and
rule became effective on the same day, but the rule was adopted by the Court of Appeals
after the statute was signed into law. Thus, the court held, the rule controlled. Presumably
it was necessary to decide whether both rule and statute were unconstitutional because if
the rule were repealed, the provisions of the statute would apply.
33. 436 F. Supp. at 1369.
34. Id. at 1370.
35. 434 U.S. 963 (1977).
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findings."M
A six-justice majority, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger,
reversed the decision of the lower court, holding that rule 911, in creating a
system in which an accused juvenile is subjected to a single proceeding, does not
impinge on the purposes of the double jeopardy clause." The majority did not
reach the argument raised by amicus" and put forth by Justice Marshall in his
dissent, that rule 911 proceedings violate the due process clause by permitting
ultimate decisionmaking by a judge who did not actually conduct the trial or
observe the witnesses.
This Note will evaluate the Swisher Court's analysis of the double jeopardy
claim and will examine the due process question addressed by the dissent. The
first part will consider the Court's disposition of the double jeopardy issue and
propose that the Court's reliance upon formal structure and designations of
proceedings as indicating whether double jeopardy protections are violated
neither takes due account of the actual functioning of Maryland juvenile courts
nor accords with its earlier decisions. In the second part, the due process issue
will be analyzed in light of the recent history of due process standards in
juvenile courts. It will be suggested that factfinding under the master system is
not sufficiently reliable to comport with the due process requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. The "balancing test" for juvenile due process
standards, as developed by the Court prior to Swisher, will be applied to the
master system with the aid of an analogy from administrative law.1° It will be
argued that the master system as presently constituted in Maryland violates
double jeopardy and other due process protections accorded to juveniles, and
ought to be modified so that it is constitutionally acceptable, or else abolished.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Double jeopardy, "one of the oldest ideas found in western civilization," ' has
roots in Greek, Roman, and canon law. ' Blackstone considered it a "universal
maxim of the common law of England, that no man is to be brought into
jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offence, ' ' 3 and his language was
followed by Congress in writing the fifth amendment."

36. 438 U.S. at 213 (footnote and citation omitted).
37. Id. at 215. The Court did not rule separately on § 3-813.
38. The California State Public Defender filed an amicus brief. Id. at 232 n.9.
39. 438 U.S. at 228-29.
40. An equal protection issue connected with the due process question is discussed in
note 196 infra.
41. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). See also M.
FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 3, 5-15 (1969).
42. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151-55 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). See Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-96 (1969); J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 1-37 (1969).
43. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *335 (Lewis ed. 1897).
44. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 340-42 (1975). Wilson provides a history of
the development of the double jeopardy clause. Although the Maryland Constitution does
not provide double jeopardy protection, the right has long been recognized under the
common law. See Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524, 528, 140 A.2d 914, 916 (1958).

19791

SWISHER V. BRADY

The double jeopardy clause 5 has been held to provide three separate
constitutional protections. "It protects against a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same
offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the
same offense." 6 The "underlying idea" of the guaranty, according to Justice
Black, is that
the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him
to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. 7
In adult criminal cases the Court has interpreted the prohibition against
retrial after acquittal broadly" and granted exceptions grudgingly. 9 The Court
has held that the double jeopardy clause is applicable to juvenile proceedings.w
In Swisher, however, it chose to apply the clause narrowly,5' and in a manner
inconsistent with the spirit and substance of a series of recent juvenile decisions.
45. See note 3 supra. Taken literally, the double jeopardy prohibition would seem to
apply only to a reprosecution in which conviction would result in a loss of life or limb.
Neither the Constitution nor the common law principle is so restrictive, however, and the
ban has been taken to apply to all cases of multiple prosecution for the same offense. E.g.,
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); see
United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287, 1294 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 15,204) (Story, J.).
46. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (footnotes omitted). See Note,
Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 265-66 (1965).
47. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957), quoted with approval in
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529-30 (1975); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377,
387-88 (1975); United States v. Horn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971); Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784, 795-96 (1969). "The prohibition is not against being twice punished, but against
being twice put in jeopardy.
... United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896).
48. The Court has referred to this aspect of the double jeopardy clause as protection
against the personal strain and expense of a second trial, e.g., Abney v. United States, 431
U.S. 651, 661 (1977); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331 (1970), and has held that, in order
to vindicate it, an immediate appeal lies from a pretrial order rejecting a defendant's claim
of double jeopardy, Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1971).
The question in connection with this aspect of the clause can be viewed in some
cases as whether the prior determination constituted an "acquittal." See United States v.
Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S 564 (1977). The Court has held that conviction of a
lesser included offense bars retrial on the greater charge. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323
(1970); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). When a prior trial is terminated
prematurely and there is thus no "acquittal," the circumstances of the prior termination
may nonetheless prohibit retrial on double jeopardy grounds. See note 126 infra.
49. E.g., Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977) (second trial justified after dismissal
for defective indictment at defendant's request); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896)
(defendant can be tried again for same offense if prior conviction has been set aside on
appeal); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824) (dismissal on ground of
"manifest necessity" does not bar retrial).
50. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975). See also note 55 infra.
51. See California v. Jesse W., 20 Cal. 3d 893, 576 P.2d 963, 145 Cal. Rptr. 1, vacated
and remanded, 439 U.S. 922 (1978). In Jesse W., the California Supreme Court had held
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The most important of these juvenile decisions, and one of the earliest, was
the 1967 landmark case of In re Gault,52 in which the Court held that certain
constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with adult criminal prosecutions - right to notice of charges, right to counsel, privilege against
self-incrimination, right to confront and cross-examine witnesses - are
applicable to juvenile proceedings that may result in commitment to a state
institution.' Gault marked a turning point in juvenile law, signalling a shift
from a reliance on a parens patriae philosophy to a conception of juvenile
proceedings, regardless of what they might be called, as functionally equivalent
to adult criminal prosecutions. Writing for the majority, Justice Fortas found it

that a de novo hearing following a hearing before a juvenile court referee is not merely a
review of a hearing previously held, but a complete new trial of the controversy, which
would expose the juvenile to jeopardy a second time. On certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light
of Swisher. In In re Raymond P., 86 Cal. App. 3d 797, 150 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1978), the
California Court of Appeals held that even though a referee's sua sponte dismissal of a
juvenile proceeding did not result from a resolution of factual issues, a subsequent de novo
hearing by a juvenile court judge exposed the juvenile to double jeopardy. In reaching its
decision, the court considered the impact of Swisher on Jesse W. and concluded: "In our
view, Swisher not only sustains the decision in Jesse W. it impels such a decision." Id. at
808, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 542.
52. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In Gault, a juvenile was charged with making an obscene
telephone call. His parents were not notified that he was taken into custody, nor were they
served with a copy of the petition alleging delinquency. The petition gave no factual basis
for the action. At the hearing, the complainant was absent, no one was sworn, and no
record was kept. Notification of a right to counsel was not given, and a confession was

obtained in the absence of counsel. The parents filed a petition for habeas corpus. The
Supreme Court reversed the state supreme court's denial of the petition. Gault was
preceded by Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), in which the Court held, expressly
on statutory grounds but while referring to the constitutional due process requirement,
that a juvenile court waiver-of-jurisdiction hearing had to "measure up to the essentials of
due process and fair treatment." Id. at 562.
53. 387 U.S. at 31-57. The broad language of the Gault opinion seems to indicate a
willingness on the part of the Court to consider favorably other juvenile claims of
constitutional rights; "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for
adults alone," id. at 13. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion, argued that any person,
child or adult, capable of being seized, charged, and convicted for violating a criminal law
must be tried in accordance with the guarantees of all of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights made applicable to the States by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 61.
54. The phrase parens patriae refers to the state's "sovereign power of guardianship
over persons under disability . . . such as minors ...." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269
(4th ed. 1968). The doctrine was set forth in Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 2 Peere Williams 103
(1772), quoted in Pernell, Interim Detention of Juvenile Delinquents in Ohio: A Proposalfor
ControllingJudicial Discretion, 39 OHIo ST. L.J. 306, 308 n.14 (1978):
The care of all infants is lodged in the king as parens patriae, and by the king this
care is delegated to his Court of Chancery . . . . Idiots and lunatics, who are
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"unrealistic" to "disregard substance because of the feeble enticement of the
'civil' label-of-convenience which has been attached to juvenile proceedings.""5

incapable to take care of themselves, are provided for by the king as parens patriae;
and there is some reason to extend this care to infants.
See generally Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of "ParensPatriae,"22
S.C.L. REV. 147 (1970); Rendelman, ParensPatriae:From Chancery to the Juvenile Court,
23 S.C.L. REV. 205 (1971).
Guided by the "state qua parent" philosophy, the early juvenile law reformers
saw:

[t]he child [as] essentially good. . . [he] was to be made "to feel that he is the object of
[the state's] care and solicitude," not that he was under arrest or trial. The rules of
criminal procedure were therefore altogether inapplicable. . . . The idea of crime and
punishment was to be abandoned. The child was to be "treated" and "rehabilitated"
and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were to be
"clinical" rather than punitive.
. . . [Piroceedings involving juveniles were described as "civil" not "criminal" and
therefore not subject to the requirements which restrict the state when it seeks to
deprive a person of his liberty.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-17 (footnotes omitted). See In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 605, 109
A.2d 523, 525 (1954). In a dissenting opinion, Judge Musmanno suggested that the real
issue was not the nature of "treatment," but whether the juvenile should be "treated" at
all.
To say that a graduate of a reform school is not to be "deemed a criminal" is very
praiseworthy but this placid bromide commands no authority in the fiercely
competitive fields of every-day modern life.
. . . In point of fact it will be a witness against him in the court of business and
commerce, it will be a bar sinister to him in the court of society where the penalties
inflicted for deviation from conventional codes can be as ruinous as those imposed in
any criminal court, it will be a sword of Damocles hanging over his head in public life,
it will be a weapon to hold him at bay as he seeks respectable and honorable
employment.
Id. at 612, 109 A.2d at 528-29. For further discussion of the history and nature ofjuvenile
courts, see Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An HistoricalPerspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187
(1970); Mack, Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104 (1909).
55. 387 U.S. at 49-50. The denomination of the juvenile courts as civil rather than
criminal has been understood to mean that specific due process rights guaranteed in
criminal proceedings by the fifth and sixth amendments, and applied to the states through
the fourteenth amendment, are not automatically applicable to juvenile proceedings. Id. at
14, 30; 59-60 (Black, J., concurring); 66 (Harlan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in
part); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541, 545 (1971) (plurality opinion); 551
(White, J., concurring); 553 (Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). In its
scrutiny of particular rights to determine whether the fourteenth amendment confers
them upon juveniles charged with criminal conduct, the Court has had to consider in what
respects juvenile proceedings differ from ordinary criminal proceedings. For example, in
Gault, the special character of a boy's incarceration was found unimportant:
A boy is charged with misconduct. The boy is committed to an institution where he
may be restrained of liberty for years. It is of no constitutional consequence - and of
limited practical meaning - that the institution to which he is committed is called an
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Three years later, in In re Winship,' the Court held specifically that the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is an essential element of due
process and is constitutionally required when a juvenile is charged with an act
that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. 7 The following year, in
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,' the Court denied juveniles a different constitutional
protection, holding that there is no right to a jury trial in delinquency
proceedings. 9 In a confusing opinion "characterized by rapid shifts of analytic
focus," 60 a plurality of four distinguished this right from those granted in Gault
and Winship. Applying the due process fundamental fairness standard, it found
a jury trial, unlike the rights in the prior cases, not crucial to the accuracy of the
factfinding process." Thus, despite the plurality's negative conclusion, McKeiver

Industrial School .... [Hlowever euphemistic the title

. .

. [it] is an institution of

confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time ....
[Tihe condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.
387 U.S. at 27-28. In Gault, the juvenile, who was charged with making an obscene
telephone call, was actually subject to a more severe punishment than an adult would
have been for the same offense. Id. at 29. By contrast, the plurality in McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547, 550-51 (1971), found that the right to a jury trial would
so alter juvenile proceedings as to make their separate existence almost pointless. Contra,
id. at 559-60 (Douglas, J., Black & Marshall, JJ., dissenting); see In re Gault, 387 U.S. at
61 (Black, J., concurring) (provisions of Bill of Rights applicable to states apply to
juveniles); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 376 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (no
constitutional requirement of due process sufficient to overcome legislative judgment of
states in juvenile area); text accompanying notes 133 to 154 infra.
56. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).

57. "The same considerations that demand extreme caution in factfinding to protect
the innocent adult apply as well to the innocent child." Id. at 365. Appellant had been
found in New York Family Court to have committed an act which if done by an adult
would have been larceny. The judge made his finding on the basis of a preponderance of
the evidence, acknowledging that guilt was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at
360 & n.2.
58. 403 U.S. 528 (1971). The case represented the consolidation for appeal of a
number of juvenile proceedings in Pennsylvania and North Carolina in which requests for
a jury trial had been denied.
59. It is not possible to state the bases on which the Court so held. A plurality of four
were joined by Justice Harlan and by Justice Brennan in one of the cases before the Court.
Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment on the ground that jury trials were not
constitutionally required of the states in all cases, even in all criminal cases, id. at 557,
adhering to a position he had unsuccessfully asserted in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 171 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Brennan agreed
with the plurality that juvenile proceedings were not criminal ones for purposes of the
sixth amendment jury trial guarantee. 403 U.S. at 553. He declared also that a jury trial
was not an essential of due process, to which juveniles were entitled, so long as the
interests served by the jury trial guarantee were adequately protected by another aspect of
the proceedings. Id. at 554. Finding the right to a public trial sufficient for this purpose, he
concurred in the result in the case from Pennsylvania, where juvenile trials were public,
and dissented as to the ones from North Carolina, where they were not. Id. at 555-57.
60. Whitebread & Batey, Juvenile Double Jeopardy, 63 GEo. L.J. 857, 862 (1975).
61. 403 U.S. at 543. See text accompanying notes 140 to 142 and note 141 infra.
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may be considered to stand in the line of cases that began with Gault 2 In
addition to distinguishing jury trials as not critical to accuracy of factfinding,
the plurality opinion returned to the "gentle conception" of parens patriae
rejected in Gault,6 arguing that juries "would remake the juvenile proceeding
into a fully adversary process,"' ' and end the "idealistic prospect of an intimate,
informal protective proceeding." In a concurring opinion Justice White, who
joined the plurality, remarked that an adult faced with criminal prosecution
deserves jury protection under the Constitution against "corrupt, biased, or
political justice" but a juvenile under prosecution does not, since he is not
threatened with "criminal guilt." This distinction does not affect the consequence of conviction, deprivation of liberty for adult or juvenile. 7
In Breed v. Jones,6 the last relevant case before Swisher, the Court
unanimously held that the double jeopardy clause was violated by prosecution of
a youth in a California adult criminal court after he had been subjected to a
delinquency hearing in juvenile court on the same charge. The hearing was
before a referee, or master, having powers not materially different from those of

62. Justice Brennan's opinion, with its emphasis on the interests served by a jury
trial, can perhaps also be viewed as consonant with this line of cases.
63. 387 U.S. at 26.
64. 403 U.S. at 545.
65. Id.

66. Id. at 551 (emphasis added). Justice White found differences of substance between
criminal and juvenile courts, which were "quite enough for [him] to hold that a jury is not
required in the latter." Id. at 553.
67. The seriousness of the punishment - lengthy incarceration - inflicted upon
juveniles found to be delinquent was much stressed in Justice Douglas' dissent.
[Wihere a State uses its juvenile court proceedings to prosecute a juvenile for a
criminal act and to order "confinement" until the child reaches 21 years of age or
where the child at the threshold of the proceedings faces that prospect, then he is
entitled to the same procedural protection as an adult.
Id. at 559 (Douglas, J., Black & Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan, although he concurred in the result in McKeiver, also viewed
juvenile proceedings as equivalent to criminal prosecutions. He noted that if he thought
that jury trials were required constitutionally in state criminal proceedings, since - as he
considered Justice Blackmun to have premised - juvenile proceedings had in effect
become criminal trials, he would be unable to see why jury trials should be denied to
juveniles. Id. at 557. Since the members of the court were thus evenly divided on the issue
whether juvenile proceedings should be treated as criminal - the plurality on the one
hand, the dissenters and Justice Harlan on the other - Justice Brennan's view is critical.
He apparently subscribed to the plurality's view. He said that he agreed with the
plurality's conclusion that the juvenile hearings "were not 'criminal prosecutions' within
the meaning of the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 553 (Brennan, J., concurring and
dissenting). That conclusion was for the plurality predicated on a difference between

juvenile detention hearings and ordinary criminal cases, id. at 540-41; although the
juvenile hearings were not "devoid of criminal aspects," id. at 541, neither had they been
held to be criminal prosecutions under the sixth amendment, id. at 540.
68. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
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a Maryland master; 9 such a hearing was enough to place the youth once in
jeopardy. The Court wrote:
We deal here, not with "the formalities of the criminal adjudicative
process," but with an analysis of an aspect of the juvenile court system in
terms of the kind of risk to which jeopardy refers. Under our decisions we
can find no persuasive distinction in that regard between the proceeding
conducted in this case . . .and a criminal prosecution, each of which is
designed "to vindicate [the] very vital interest in enforcement of criminal
laws."70
Having concluded accordingly that jeopardy had attached at the juvenile
hearing," the Court also rejected the contention that the jeopardy had
"continued" from that hearing to the adult criminal trial.72 Decisive as this
holding was, the violation of double jeopardy was found to occur not within the
juvenile system, but only upon passage to criminal court and retrial there.
The Court's analysis in Swisher began with the statement of two related
principles that it considered to govern the case: constitutional protection against
double jeopardy prohibits a second trial following an acquittal; 7 and a defendant
has a right to have his trial completed by a "particular tribunal."74 The narrow
question of the case was "whether the State in filing exceptions to a master's
proposals, pursuant to rule 911, thereby 'require[s] an accused to stand trial' a
second time. 75 In the Court's view, there were several reasons why the state's
action does not do so.

69. See Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. at 215 n.12.
70. 421 U.S. at 531 (citations omitted).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 534. For the application of Breed to Swisher, see text accompanying notes
112 to 114 infra. Justice Holmes enunciated the concept of continuing jeopardy in his
dissenting opinion in Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904). In his view, "a man
cannot be said to be more than once in jeopardy in the same cause, however often he may be
tried.The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy, from its beginning to the end of the cause."
Id. at 134 (emphasis added). The continuing jeopardy concept has never been adopted by a
majority of the Court. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 534 (1975); United States v.
Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 369 (1975).
73. 438 U.S. at 214-15 (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503-05
(1978)).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 215. The Court rejected the state's chief argument that jeopardy does not
attach at the hearing before the master, but noted that it was not essential to its decision
to fix the precise time at which jeopardy attaches. Id. at 215 n.12. However, such a
determination would be important for purposes of permitting reprosecution after a
mistrial. See Schulhofer, Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 449, 454 (1977).
The question addressed in Swisher has more or less direct application to juvenile
court systems in 25 states. ALA. CODE §§ 15-19-1 to -7 (1975); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-231 (Supp. 1979); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 247 (West Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, § 913 (1975); IDAHO CODE § 16-1843 (Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-12-2-17
(Burns Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 231.3 (West Supp. 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
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The first was that the accused juvenile is subject only to a single proceeding
beginning with a hearing before the master and culminating in an adjudication
by a judge.78 Next, the Court stated, a rule 911 proceeding fulfills a central
purpose of the double jeopardy clause - preventing the prosecution from having
a second opportunity to supply evidence" - because the record is closed after
the state presents its evidence before the master. Additional evidence can be
received by the juvenile judge only with the consent of the juvenile. 8
Furthermore, rule 911 empowers only the judge to make binding determinations. Thus, there is not the increased risk of conviction of an innocent defendant
that might arise if the state had the chance to persuade two factfinders.9
Finally, the Court noted that there was nothing in the record to indicate that a
rule 911 proceeding "subjects the defendant to the embarrassment, expense and
ordeal of a second trial."8
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Powell, dissented. In the
first part of his opinion he castigated the Court for enabling the state in rule 911
proceedings to circumvent the protections of the double jeopardy clause by
simply redefining trial and appellate functions.8 He stated: "[Ojur Constitution
is not so fragile an instrument that its substantive prohibitions may be evaded
by formal designations that fail to correspond with the actual functions

§ 24A.100 (Baldwin Supp, 1977); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:1580.1 (West 1968); MINN.
§ 260.031 (West 1977); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-29 (Supp. 1977); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 211.023 (Supp. 1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-236.01 (1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.090
(1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:4-12 (West 1952); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.16 (1976);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1126 (1977); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.581 (1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 8-10-3 (Supp. 1976); S.C. CODE § 15-1120 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-207 (1976);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-14 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.030 (1962); W. VA.
CODE § 49-5A-1 (Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. § 14-115.11 (1975). In six states, both the
juvenile and the state have the right to request a hearing before a judge in the first
instance. The state's failure to object to a hearing before a master operates as a waiver of
any right to except to adverse factual findings by the master. CoLO.REV. STAT. § 19-1-110
(1974); GA. CODE ANN.§ 24-A-701 (1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.10 (1968); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 27-20-07 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-301 (Purdon Supp. 1977); Thx.
FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 54.01 (1976). In Arkansas and Kansas, it appears to be the case
that the master has authority to enter final orders. ARs. STAT. ANN. § 45-408 (1977); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 20-310a (Supp. 1977).
76. 438 U.S. at 215. See MD. R.P. 911(a)(2).
77. 438 U.S. at 215-16. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
78. 438 U.S. at 216. See MD. R.P. 911(d).
79. 438 U.S. at 216.
80. Id. Imposition of such burdens is proscribed by Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184, 187-88 (1957), in which the Court held that retrial on a first degree murder charge
after the defendant had been tried on the charge and found guilty of second degree murder
violated double jeopardy. The Chief Justice likened the burdens of a rule 911 proceeding to
"those resulting from a judge's permissible request for post-trial briefing or argument
following a bench trial." 438 U.S. at 217.
81. 438 U.S. at 222-23. Justice Marshall agreed with the majority that jeopardy
attaches at the master's hearing. Id. at 220 (citing the majority opinion, id. at 215 n.12).
See note 75 supra.
STAT. ANN.
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performed."" Justice Marshall argued that it is inaccurate to say that only the
judge is authorized to act as factfinder, because rule 911 expressly recognizes
that the judge may enter his order "based on" the master's findings, without
independently reviewing the record himself' Thus, according to Justice
Marshall, although the master's findings are nominally "proposed," they are, in
effect, final orders of the court."
Because of its reliance upon "formal designations" as determinative of the
substance of proceedings, the Court's holding further complicates the problem of
identifying which constitutional rights are possessed by juveniles. As Justice
Marshall observed, the Court was placing great importance upon the fact that
Maryland has conferred the names of factfinder and adjudicator only on the
juvenile court judge.H Although it is true that rule 911 refers to the master as a
maker of "proposed" findings and orders,M the evidence is conclusive that in
practice it is his findings that are determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
juvenile. This was made clear in Aldridge v. Dean,87 in which the single-judge
district court found that "on the average, the judge devotes a little less than one
minute to each proposed order. . . . Unless an exception has been filed by one
side or the other, the judge seldom modifies the master's proposed order.' Thus,
in most cases, the master's "proposed" order is in fact final, requiring only the
judge's signature to make it formally so. It follows that when a juvenile appears
before the master he is genuinely subject to a "risk of a determination of guilt,"89
which sets the stage for double jeopardy if the judge subsequently redetermines
the case on the state's exceptions. The general rule that actual practice and
substance, rather than theory and form, determine the significance of court

82. 438 U.S. at 222.
83. Id. at 223-24. See MD. R.P. 911(b) & (d).
84. 438 U.S. at 224. The dissent noted that the lower court, 436 F. Supp. at 1364, had
found that, "except when the State filed an exception, all of the masters' recommended
findings of non-delinquency had been approved by the judge." 438 U.S. at 223-24 n.5.
Furthermore, the state trial judge who first heard the juveniles' double jeopardy claim and
found in their favor had concluded:
[ilt is impossible for the Judge ... , who also carries a full docket of cases himself, to
exercise any independent, meaningful judgment in the overwhelming majority of the
many thousands of [master's] orders put before him each year ....
With this being
the case it is difficult to see how realistically a Master can be called only an adviser.
. . ITihe
[
master conducts for all intents and purposes, full-blown and complete
proceedings through the adjudicatory and dispositional phases and ... as a practical
matter he imposes sanctions and can effectively deprive youngsters of their freedom.
Id. (quoting In re Anderson, No. 158187 (Cir. Ct. Balt. City, Juv. Div., Aug. 1, 1973)). A
special commission on juvenile justice had reached a similar conclusion. 438 U.S. at 224
n.5 (quoting

FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE TO THE GOVERNOR AND

GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND

13 (1977)).

85. 438 U.S. at 226.
86. Mo. R.P. 911(b).

87. 395 F. Supp. 1161 (D. Md. 1975). See text accompanying notes 18 to 23 supra.
88. 395 F. Supp. at 1170-71 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). See also note 84
supra.
89. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 391 (1975).
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proceedings in double jeopardy cases is well established. 0 Accordingly, neither
the lack of the appellation of factfinder nor the absence of authority to sign final
orders can be fairly held to render the master's hearing incomplete.
Given that "It]here is little difference in the conduct of an adjudicatory
hearing before a master and the conduct of such a hearing before the judge,"'"
and given the perfunctory nature of the judge's role, 2 it is not surprising that
the court in Aldridge found:
The juvenile and his family regard, and are justified in regarding, the
hearing before the master as a trial. They are supported in this view by the
fact that the master not only announces his findings as to whether or not
the charge has been sustained, but often either causes the child to be
forthwith released from existing custody or taken into custody, without
waiting for an order to be signed by the judge.93
If, as is extremely likely, the juvenile who is found not delinquent by the master
reasonably assumes he has been acquitted, then it is very difficult to understand
the Court's position that he does not suffer the same "embarrassment, expense
and ordeal" as an adult would from the appeal of an acquittal." The Court stated
that there was nothing in the record to prove this point,95 but this assertion
appears to be part of the Court's undue emphasis on form. In fact, the juvenile is
required to appear at the hearing on the record, and his attorney presents oral
argument.9 If the Court had viewed the rehearing as a second trial, however,
and ignored its "label-of-convenience,"97 it is unlikely it would have thought
such evidence in the record necessary." The Court's comparison of a rehearing to
90. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977) (judgment of
acquittal on motion after deadlocked jury discharged an acquittal in substance); id. at 582
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 198 (1957) (finding of
guilty on second degree murder charge implied acquittal of first degree murder charge,
discharge of jury without express finding on first degree murder charge an acquittal in
substance); cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967)
(juvenile proceeding substantial equivalent of criminal trial).
91. Aldridge v. Dean, 395 F. Supp. 1161, 1170 (D. Md. 1975).
92. See notes 84 & 88 and accompanying text supra.
93. 395 F. Supp. at 1171.
94. See 438 U.S. at 216-17. Such hardship is especially to be deplored in the case of a
juvenile, who may be brought to resist the rehabilitative efforts of the court by his belief
that he was dealt with unfairly. See Carr, The Effect of the Double Jeopardy Clause on
Juvenile Proceedings,6 U. TOL. L. REv. 1, 19 (1974); Whitebread & Batey, Juvenile Double
Jeopardy, 63 GEo. L.J. 857, 862 (1975). See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26-27 & n.37
(1967).
95. 438 U.S. at 216-17.
96. This is a matter of practice, not law. Telephone conversation with Judge Robert L.
Karwacki, Administrative Judge, Supreme Bench of Baltimore City (Jan. 10, 1979).
97. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
98. It has long been accepted that repeated attempts to convict will produce
"embarrassment, expense and ordeal" for the defendant. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519,
529-30 (1975); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 387-88 (1975); United States v.
Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-96 (1969); Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
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a "post-trial briefing, or argument following a bench trial"" is inappropriate
since such proceedings are before the original factfinder, who presumably has
not yet reached a decision. Justice Marshall's analogy to a trial judge and an
appellate court ' 0° better represents the actual nature of the proceeding.
Formal differences between types of proceedings were also stressed by the
Court in distinguishing Kepner v. United States'' from the facts presented in
Swisher.0 2 In Kepner, the defendant was acquitted of an embezzlement charge
following a bench trial in a Philippine court. The government appealed to the
Philippine Supreme Court, which found the defendant guilty. Under the
Philippine system, derived from the Spanish system of law,
a person was not regarded as being in jeopardy in the legal sense until there
had been a final judgment in the court of last resort. The lower courts were
deemed examining courts, having preliminary jurisdiction, and the accused
was not finally convicted or acquitted until the case had been passed upon
in the . . . supreme court . . . . The trial was regarded as one continuous
proceeding, and the double jeopardy protection given was against a second
conviction after this final trial had been concluded in due form of law.' 3°
Relying on United States v. Ball,"' in which the Court had prohibited a retrial
even though the prior verdict of acquittal had been declared void because it had
been entered on a Sunday, the Kepner Court held that "to try a man after a
verdict of acquittal is to put him twice in jeopardy, although the verdict was not
followed by judgment."05 The Swisher Court distinguished Kepner because the
trial judge there had formal authority to enter a final order, so that appellate
review of his final judgment was in question."

99. 438 U.S. at 217.
100. Id. at 222.
101. 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
102. 438 U.S. at 217 n.15.
103. 195 U.S. at 121. See note 72 supra. The defendant's claim was based on a
statutory provision that extended double jeopardy protection to citizens of the then
American territory of the Philippines. The government contended that because the
statute's double jeopardy protection had to be construed in light of the local judicial
system, which Congress intended to leave in effect, it did not preclude the proceeding
involved. 195 U.S. at 120. The Court found that since Congress' intent was to make some
of the "essential principles of American constitutional jurisprudence" applicable to the
territory and "engraft them upon" the local system, id. at 121-22, the statutory language
was to be interpreted in light of the settled meaning of the term under the Constitution,
id. at 124. The statutory provision that the Philippine Supreme Court was to exercise its
previous jurisdiction was not intended to affect the specific guarantee of the double
jeopardy provision. Id. at 125. Because the Court relied on cases interpreting the double
jeopardy clause of the sixth amendment in interpreting the parallel clause of the statute,
id. at 124, the case is considered to be of constitutional magnitude. 438 U.S. at 225 n.6
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
104. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
105. 195 U.S. at 133.
106. 438 U.S. at 217 n,15.
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Justice Marshall found in this distinction another instance of exalting form
over substance.0 7 He reminded the Court that it was established that "an
tacquittal' is not necessarily determined by the form of the order.""' What
characterizes an acquittal, rather, is that the "ruling .

. .,

whatever its label,

actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual
elements of the offense charged."' He argued that a master's decision is fully
equivalent to an acquittal and that the Court's rationale in Swisher gave the
state the power to create several levels of appeal by simply labeling lower levels
of decisionmaking "proposed" or "tentative.""' As has been shown in this
section,' the master's "proposed" findings are indeed "resolutions" in every
sense save name, and thus the Ball and Kepner holdings, which stress the threat
of multiple prosecutions and minimize the need for formal judgment, seem
particularly appropriate to Swisher.
The Court also distinguished Breed v. Jones,"' finding it inapplicable
because the Maryland procedure involved "only one proceeding" and consequently the rejection in Breed of the idea that jeopardy continued from one trial to
another had no bearing on Swisher."' However, there is nothing in the Breed
opinion to suggest that the Court there intended to limit its rule to prevent
successive prosecutions only in separate court systems. Moreover, such a reading
seems incorrect if only because it would permit successive prosecutions of a
juvenile on the same charge by two different juvenile judges. If one accepts that
the master's hearing in fact creates a "risk of a determination of guilt""' and
that the judge's signature is not necessary to complete the initial jeopardy, then
Breed is inapposite only if no further risk to the juvenile can result from
proceedings subsequent to the master's adjudication.
In fact such risk can and does occur. Rule 911 gives the state the forbidden
"second crack""' at the defendant before another factfinder; it subjects him "to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compel[s] him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity.""' Although it may be true, as the Court states,

that a rule 911 hearing on the record "bar[s] the prosecution from another
opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceed-

107. Id. at 225-27.
108. Id. at 226 (citing Martin Linen Supply Co. v. United States, 430 U.S. 564, 571
(1977) (judgment of acquittal on motion after deadlocked jury discharged an acquittal in
substance); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336 (1975) (whether dismissal of
indictment is actually an "acquittal" left undecided by Court); United States v. Sisson, 399
U.S. 267, 270 (1970) (decision characterized as an "arrest of judgment" by lower court is in
fact a "directed acquittal")).
109. Martin Linen Supply Co. v. United States, 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977). See 438 U.S.
at 226 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
110. 438 U.S. at 226-27.
111. See text accompanying notes 86 to 89 supra.
112. 421 U.S. 519 (1975). See text accompanying notes 68 to 72 supra.
113. 438 U.S. at 217-18.
114. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 391 (1975).
115. 438 U.S. at 215.
116. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
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ing,"'17 rule 911 does not "preclude the prosecutor from enhancing the risk that
' 8
an innocent defendant may be convicted.""
This is so because the state is free to
present a new and more effective closing argument at the hearing on the
record, " 9 and also simply because at a second hearing a different conclusion may
be reached on the basis of the same evidence. 12
The foregoing arguments assume that the master's hearing amounts to a
complete trial. Even if that is not so, Justice Marshall contended that by
permitting the state to take exceptions to a master's findings, rule 911 denies
the juvenile his "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular
tribunal, 1

21

a right also protected by the double jeopardy clause.

22

This is so, in

117. 438 U.S. at 215-16 (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978)).
118. Id. at 216 (citing Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978)).
119. Rule 911 is silent on what constitutes the record, but it has been held that a
record should not contain arguments of counsel. Silverberg v. Silverberg, 148 Md. 682,
694, 130 A. 325, 329 (1925). Defense counsel has an absolute right to make closing
argument, Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975); presumably the State does as well.
120. One commentator has calculated the probability of conviction if a defendant has to
undergo successive trials.
[If the evidence were such that one in four [judges] would convict, and three in four
acquit, the probability of conviction if the defendant is tried once is, of course, one in
four (4/16). If two trials were permitted the defendant would have to convince two
[judges] of his innocence and the probability of one of the two convicting would be 1 (/4x 3/4)
= (7/16); assuming the independence of each [judge] and the absence of other

variables. If he had to convince five [judges] his probability of conviction by one would
rise to over three in four.
Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 278 n.74 (1965).
121. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949).
122. Id. at 689-90. See 438 U.S. at 227 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In United States v.
Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978), the Court wrote, "[Wie pressed too far in Jenkins the concept of
the 'defendant's valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal."' Id. at
100 (citation omitted). The broad language of United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 370
(1975), cited by appellees in Swisher, 438 U.S. at 218, in support of that right, was as
follows:
[Ilt is enough for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause . .. that further
proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolution of factual issues, going to the
elements of the offense charged, would have been required upon reversal and remand.
Even if the DistrictCourt were to receive no additional evidence, it would be necessary
for it to make supplemental findings . .

.

. [To do so] would violate the Double

Jeopardy Clause.
420 U.S. at 370 (emphasis added by Swisher appellees). It was explicitly repudiated in
Scott, 437 U.S. at 82, where the Court said that only those proceedings requiring the
making of supplemental findings that follow a previous trial ending in an acquittal, in a
conviction either not reversed on appeal or reversed because of insufficient evidence, or in
a mistrial ruling not prompted by "manifest necessity" are barred by the double jeopardy
clause. The Swisher Court accordingly dismissed Jenkins. The Court noted also that
Jenkins was inapposite because, like Kepner, see note 106 and accompanying text
supra, it involved appellate review of the final judgment of a trial court. 438 U.S. at
218. However, the issue in Scott was a narrow one, concerned with a government appeal
from mid-trial dismissal requested by the defendant; thus while the Scott Court may have
rejected, in dicta, what was really a general dictum in Jenkins, it is difficult to see how the
Swisher Court could read Scott as determining exactly which "proceedings requiring the
making of supplemental findings . . . are barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause."
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Justice Marshall's view, because the master acts, for purposes of the adjudicatory hearing, as the "particular tribunal."'" Under rule 911, a juvenile can
never, as a matter of law, have his trial completed before the "particular
tribunal," since the master's recommendations must be confirmed by the
2

juvenile judge.1

What occurs when exceptions are taken is in fact closely analogous to a
mistrial, inasmuch as the ordinary progress toward acceptance by the judge of
the master's decision" is interrupted. Under the manifest necessity exception to
double jeopardy protection, a defendant can be subjected to retrial after a
mistrial without a violation of double jeopardy only if the first trial had to be
terminated prematurely because of "manifest necessity" or because "the ends of
public justice would otherwise be defeated. '

'26

Although "virtually all of the [manifest necessity] cases turn on the
particular facts and thus escape meaningful categorization,"'2 7 it is apparent
that neither "the ends of public justice," nor an "important countervailing
interest of proper judicial administration"'" would be defeated if the state were
123. 438 U.S. at 228. Justice Marshall stated:
This hearing is a formal, adjudicatory proceeding at which the State's witnesses
testify and are cross-examined; the juvenile may present evidence in his own defense;
and the juvenile is entitled to counsel and to remain silent. Presentation of evidence at
that proceeding is keyed to the reactions and attitudes of the presiding master.
Id.
124. Id.
125. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
126. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824). The "manifest
necessity" doctrine has been invoked, for example, in cases involving mistrials declared
because of a hung jury, id.; a defective indictment, Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458
(1973); and juror prejudice, Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891), and
disqualification, Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894). It was also applied to a
mistrial declared to allow prosecution witnesses to seek advice on self-incrimination in
their testimony. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971) (plurality opinion). Cases in
which application was rejected, and retrial barred, include ones involving prosecutorial
misconduct, Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1964) (mistrial declared because of
absence, known to prosecutor before trial, of key prosecution witness); and defendant's
request for or consent to mistrial or dismissal, Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977);
United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
The exception was recently discussed, and the standard for determining "manifest
necessity" explicated, in Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978). The Court there held
that a trial judge's discretionary decision whether to declare a mistrial was to be given
more weight where a hung jury or juror bias results in mistrial than when prosecutorial
misconduct does. Id. at 507-14. The court also stated that a judge's explicit statement that
a mistrial was being declared for "manifest necessity" was not necessary. Id. at 516-17
(dictum).
127. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 464 (1973) (citations omitted). See Schulhofer,
Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 449, 451 (1977). Schulhofer surveys ten
categories of mistrial cases, including those involving formal defects in the institution of
the proceedings, prosecutorial misconduct, and prejudice or error in taking testimony. He
reviews the evolution of the "manifest necessity" test, and proposes a flexible approach to
mistrial problems.
128. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471 (1973).
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prohibited from taking exceptions to masters' findings. The state's interest in
taking exceptions, and thus "changing tribunals," arises out of its dissatisfaction
with the master's decision. This basis of interest would not satisfy the manifest
necessity test: it is violative of double jeopardy for "the prosecutor to seek to
persuade a second trier of fact of the defendant's guilt after having failed with
the first."'" Moreover, the result of application of the test - assuming that it is
applicable at all - seems especially clear when, as is the case under rule 911,
the trial is terminated when it is practically completed, and the likelihood of a
130
second jeopardy is therefore particularly great.
In sum, the Swisher Court based its finding of no double jeopardy violation
in a juvenile rehearing primarily upon a formalistic interpretation of Maryland
juvenile proceedings under the master system. Yet the substance of those
proceedings appears to indicate that violation does occur.
DUE PROCESS

The expansion from Gault to Breed of constitutional protection allowed to
juveniles1 3' was accompanied by an evolution of the appropriate general due
process standards to be applied in juvenile proceedings. A question raised by
amicus in Swisher, and addressed by Justice Marshall in the second part of his
dissent, was whether - in a case in which a juvenile is accused of an act that
would be a crime if committed by an adult - a procedure, according to which
the ultimate trier of fact bases his decision upon a cold record of a trial he did
not conduct, is sufficiently reliable to comport with due process requirements.'2
Since this question must be considered in light of the evolution just referred to,
the present section begins with a brief reexamination, from the point of view of
due process standards, of the relevant developments from Gault to Breed and
then treats the issue in Swisher, with particular reliance upon the holding of
Winship. An analogy from administrative law, especially apposite because of
Breed, concludes the section.
129. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975). See also Ashe v. Swenson, 397
U.S. 436, 446-47 (1970).
130. See United States v. Gentile, 525 F.2d 252, 256 n.2 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 903 (1976); Schulhofer, supra note 127, at 507-11.
131. See notes 52 to 72 and accompanying text supra.
132. 438 U.S. at 229-30. Justice Marshall asserted that it was within the majority's
power to reach the issue raised by amicus because it had been argued in substance in
opposition to appellant's motion to dismiss the complaint and because affirming the
judgment of the district court on this ground would not have the effect of expanding the
relief granted. Id. at 229 n.10. He also emphasized the narrowness of the Court's decision,
which was only that the Maryland system and others like it are not unconstitutional
under the double jeopardy clause. A contrary finding under the due process clause, he
pointed out, might well be made in another case. Id. at 230.
A very similar question should be resolved shortly by the Court in United States
v. Raddatz, argued February 25, 1980, 48 U.S.L.W. 3568 (U.S. March 4, 1980) (No. 79-8).
A criminal defendant is there challenging on due process grounds the validity of a
statutory provision, 28 U.S. § 636 (1976), permitting a pretrial suppression hearing to be
held by a federal magistrate, with subsequent de novo determination of controverted
issues by, and argument before, a judge.
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A. Due Process Standards in Juvenile Proceedings: From Gault To Breed
The Court stated firmly in Gault that a juvenile court adjudication of
delinquency "'must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair
treatment.'"

What was "essential" was determined in Gault primarily by

careful examination of particular rights in question, their basis in law, and their
applicability to the special, supposedly beneficent juvenile court system.'-' In
connection with this determination, the Court wrote:
It is claimed that juveniles obtain benefits from the special procedures
applicable to them which more than offset the disadvantages of denial of the
substance of normal due process. .

.

. [Tihe observance of due process

standards, intelligently and not ruthlessly administered, will not compel the
States to abandon or displace any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile
process.ln
This general assertion was replaced in Winship 63 by the more cautious claim
that the particular right at issue there - requirement of proof beyond a
'
reasonable doubt in criminal cases - would not so "compel the States."37
The
Court in Winship gave some attention to the argument that to grant juveniles
that right would "risk destruction of beneficial aspects of the juvenile process,"
but rejected the argument. ' 3 In McKeiverl the plurality opinion of the Court
appeared to draw back from Gault in two ways. First, Justice Blackmun
declared that "the applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings, as
developed by Gault and Winship, is fundamental fairness. As that standard was
applied in those two cases, we have an emphasis on factfinding procedures."'14
This rather narrow reading of the cases' led the plurality to evaluate - and
133. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967) (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,
562 (1966)). The phrase was applied in Kent only to a waiver-of-jurisdiction hearing.
134. See Rudstein, Double Jeopardy in Juvenile Proceedings, 14 WM. & MARY L.
266, 275 (1972).

REV.

135. 387 U.S. at 21. The Court went on to state that the benefits had been much
exaggerated. Id. at 21-30.
136. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
137. Id. at 367.
138. Id. at 366-67 (citation omitted). The Court found that use of the reasonable doubt
standard would not affect New York's policies that a finding of delinquency was not a
criminal conviction and did not deprive the juvenile of his civil rights; nor would it affect
confidentiality, informality, flexibility, or speed of the hearing, nor the distinctive features
of pre- and post-hearing procedures.
139. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
140. Id. at 543. The term "fundamental fairness" was used by the Court in this context
in Winship, 397 U.S. at 363, although the Court appeared to prefer the language of Gault,
see id. at 359. Justice Black took the occasion in Winship to denounce "fairness" as not a
constitutional guarantee at all, but only the "old 'shock-the-conscience' test." Id. at 377-86
(Black, J., dissenting).
141. In Winship the Court indeed referred to the need for "extreme caution in
factfinding." 397 U.S. at 365. However, whatever emphasis on factfinding existed in Gault
and Winship was not essential to the general question of due process standards but arose
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deny - the right to a jury trial chiefly in terms of its effect upon the "factfinding
function" of the juvenile court. ' Secondly, Justice Blackmun stressed more
strongly than before the importance of avoiding even "attrition of the juvenile
court's assumed ability to function in a unique manner." "3 The Gault Court had
expressed assurance that no harm would come to the juvenile courts from
application, of the "essentials of due process and fair treatment," which, it had
written, "must" be present in juvenile proceedings. This assurance was now
replaced by caution in weighing those rights against the claims of the juvenile
courts to be allowed their peculiar procedures. Their factfinding methods in
particular, their "unique functioning" in general, were now perceived as so
valuable as not to be made subject to any "attrition." A kind of balancing test for
due process protection was being put forward: in deciding whether juveniles
were entitled to a given type of protection the Court was apparently to consider
two issues. On the one hand, it had to judge how far application of the protection
in question would contribute to "fundamental fairness" - not, as in Gault,
simply whether it was "essential" to due process. Equally, the Court had to
consider to what degree the protection would impair the "unique functioning" of
the juvenile court, especially in factfinding.'"
In Breed,'" finally, the Court noted that in the earlier cases it had "evinced
awareness of the threat" posed by application of constitutional guarantees in
juvenile proceedings "to the efforts of the juvenile court system, functioning in a
unique manner, to ameliorate the harshness of criminal justice when applied to
juvenile offenders,"'" but stated nevertheless:
That the flexibility and informality of juvenile proceedings are diminished
by the application of due process standards is not open to doubt. Due process
standards inevitably produce such an effect, but that tells us no more than
that the Constitution imposes burdens on the functioning of government
and especially on law enforcement institutions."7
It was the more remarkable, then, that the Court went on to add a new
consideration to those that had earlier been balanced against the importance of
due process protection, the cost and administrative burden such protection
would lay upon the juvenile court system. "[JIuvenile courts," the Court wrote,
"perhaps even more than most courts, suffer from the problems created by
spiraling caseloads unaccompanied by enlarged resources and manpower. And

out of the particular rights at issue and so was probably only coincidental. See Rudstein,
supra note 134, at 277.
142. 403 U.S. at 543, 547.
143. Id. at 547.
144. See Note, Double Jeopardyand the Waiver of Jurisdictionin California'sJuvenile
Courts, 24 STAN. L. REV. 874, 892-95 (1972).
145. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
146. Id. at 528-29.
147. Id. at 535 n.15.
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courts should be reluctant to impose on the juvenile court system any additional
requirements which could so strain its resources as to endanger its unique
functions."4' '
The Breed Court went on to make clear its concern with "burdens .. .
quantitatively sufficient to justify a departure . . . from the fundamental

prohibition against double jeopardy,"'4 9 with "significant problem[s] for the
administration of the juvenile court system,"'" with "commitment of resources,"'' and the like.52 Thus, even as it agreed to apply double jeopardy
protections in a new setting, the Court indicated, by its weighing of administrative cost against due process rights, how reluctant it was to regard juvenile
proceedings in the same light as traditional criminal proceedings." The Swisher
decision did not discuss the balancing test, which awaits further definition by
the Court.'
B.

Due Process and Trial by Transcript

The Winship decision requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt,'55 together
with the emphasis on proper factfinding made explicit in the McKeiver plurality
opinion,"s suggests strongly that the reliability of adjudication under the master
system is insufficient to meet due process standards. The Swisher dissent in fact
found the system inherently unreliable, and thus inadequate to establish proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. 5 '
Masters have traditionally been expressly subordinate to the court that
appoints them.' s In Maryland juvenile proceedings, however, masters have
broad hearing powers, which fall just short of entering final orders. After

148. Id. at 537 (citation omitted).
149. Id. at 537.
150. Id. at 538.
151. Id. at 538-39.
152. The dissent in McKeiver suggested that such considerations had been urged upon
the Court in that case. 403 U.S. at 561 & n.*.
153. See 25 DE PAUL L. REv. 783, 789-92 (1976), and cases cited therein. "In the adult
criminal context, administrative concerns surface when the court decides that the
proceeding in question is 'not part of a criminal prosecution."' Id. at 791 n.47 (quoting
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)). See note 55 supra.
154. See generally Chase, The Burger Court, the Individual, and the CriminalProcess:
Directions and Misdirections,52 N.Y.U.L. REv. 518 (1977); Israel, CriminalProcedure, The
Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319 (1977).
155. The requirement . . . has this vital role in our criminal procedure for cogent
reasons. The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interest of immense
importance, both because of the possibility he may lose his liberty upon conviction and
because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized.
397 U.S. at 363. See text
accompanying notes 56 & 57 supra.
156. See text accompanying notes 139 to 144 supra.
157. 438 U.S. at 229-32 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
158. See note 6 supra. But see note 75 supra (two states empower juvenile masters to
enter final orders).
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hearing all the evidence and assessing the credibility of witnesses," they
transmit to the juvenile court judge a transcript or a tape recording'O of the
hearing, along with their proposed findings and orders. 6 ' If there are no
exceptions to the orders, the judge virtually always approves them after barely a
moment's consideration.'62 If the State takes exception, the judge conducts a
hearing on the record" and arrives at a determination without ever having
personally conducted a trial or observed witnesses.
Whether a judge's review of the record under such circumstances affords a
juvenile defendant his due process rights necessarily involves a determination
of whether such methods are adequate to establish proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. This question has never been specifically addressed,'" but the importance
of proper factfinding is well established." The Court has also evinced grave
doubts about both the separation of the hearing and decisionmaking functions in
criminal cases and the use of mechanical factfinding procedures. In Holiday v.
Johnson,166 a prisoner had applied for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging he was
being unlawfully detained in Alcatraz Penitentiary. 7 A district court commissioner took the prisoner's testimony at Alcatraz and submitted a report setting

159. In re Brown, 13 Md. App. 625, 631, 284 A.2d 441, 445 (1971).
160. Rule 911(b) specifies a "written report," but the lower court's opinion in Swisher,
436 F. Supp. at 1363, states that the proceedings in Baltimore City are recorded on tape.
The practice in Anne Arundel County is the same. Telephone conversation with Master
Arthur 0. Anderson, Anne Arundel County Circuit Court (Jan. 11, 1979).
161. MD. R.P. 911(b).
162. See note 84; text accompanying notes 87 & 88 supra.
163. MD. R.P. 911(c).
164. Two related issues, which have been discussed elsewhere, should be distinguished
from the instant one: the obvious practical advantages of electronically recorded testimony
and the sixth amendment right of a defendant to be confronted with the witnesses against
him. The latter, which is applicable to juvenile proceedings, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 56-57
(1967), may be formally violated in the master system because the judge is denominated
factfinder. However, he is so in name only. See text accompanying notes 83 to 91 supra.
Confrontation does occur before the true factfinder, the master, and accordingly it is
difficult to claim that a genuine violation occurs. See generally Barber & Bates, Videotape
in Criminal Proceedings, 25 HASTINGs L.J. 1017 (1974); Doret, Trial by Videotape - Can
Justice Be Seen to Be Done?, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 228 (1974); Griswold, The Due Process
Revolution and Confrontation,119 U. PA. L. REV. 711 (1971); Kornblum, Videotape in Civil
Cases, 24 HASTINGs L.J. 9 (1972); Note, Use of PriorRecorded Testimony and the Right of
Confrontation,54 IOWA L. REV. 360 (1968).
165. The Court has stated:

To experienced lawyers it is commonplace that the outcome of a lawsuit ...
depends more often upon how the factfinder appraises the facts than on a disputed
construction of a statute.. . . Thus the procedures by which the facts of the case are
determined assume an importance fully as great as the substantive rule of law to be
applied. And the more important the rights at stake, the more important must be the
procedural safeguards surrounding those rights.
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958), quoted in Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. at 230
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
166. 313 U.S. 342 (1941).
167. Id. at 347.
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forth his findings of fact, conclusions, and recommendation that the writ be
denied.'6 On appeal of the district court's denial of the writ, the Supreme Court
ruled that the district judge should have himself heard the prisoner's testimony,
found the facts, and based his disposition upon his own findings. 69
As Justice Marshall noted in Swisher, although the holding in Holiday was
a statutory one, 70 the Court's "reasoning went to the fundamental nature of the
kind of factfinding on which many judicial determinations must rest": 7'
One of the essential elements of the determination of the crucial facts is
the weighing and appraising of the testimony. .

.

. We cannot say that an

appraisal of the truth of the prisoner's oral testimony by a master or
commissioner is, in the light of the purpose and object of the proceeding, the
of the judge's own exercise of the function of the trier of the
equivalent
72
facts.1

It is a centuries-old idea that the trier of fact himself should see and hear
testimony, except when death or absence of the witness makes it necessary to
resort to a transcript or other record. 3 A modem opinion graphically expressed
the reasons for the requirement:
[T]he demeanor of the orally-testifying witness is "always assumed to be in
evidence." It is "wordless language." The liar's story may seem uncontradicted by one who merely reads it, yet it may be "contradicted" in the trial
court by his manner, his intonations, his grimaces, his gestures and the like
- all matters which "cold print does not preserve", and which constitute
"lost evidence" as far as an upper court is concerned. . . .A "stenographic
transcript correct in every detail . . . is like a dehydrated peach; it has

neither the substance nor the flavor of the fruit before it was dried."'74

168. Id. at 348.
169. Id. at 353-54.
170. The statute construed was 28 U.S.C. § 461 (1940) (present version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2243 (1971)).
171. 438 U.S. at 230-31.
172. 313 U.S. at 352 (emphasis added), quoted in 438 U.S. at 231.
173. See 11 & 12 Vict., c.42, § 17 (1848); 5 & 6 Edw. VI, c.ll, § 12 (1552); in proceedings
in Parliament Against Sir John Fenwick (House of Commons), 13 How. St. Tr. 538, 592
(1696), it was noted: "Our law requires persons to appear and give their testimony viva
voce; and we see that their testimony appears credible, or not, by their very countenances,
and the manner of their delivery . ..."
174. Broadcast Music v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.
1949) (footnotes omitted). See FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3); cf.NLRB v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 526
F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1975) (administrative law; "decisions by administrative factfinders
as to demeanor and credibility will be overturned by court only when contrary evidence is
overwhelmingly compelling"); NLRB v. Warrensburg Board & Paper Corp., 340 F.2d 920,
922 (2d Cir. 1965) (questions of credibility are for the trier of fact). See also text
accompanying notes 181 to 191 infra.
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The propriety of using electronically recorded evidence as a substitute for
live testimony was addressed in Wingo v. Wedding.75 In that case, which
specifically upheld the Holiday ruling,"' it had been contended that the use of a
magistrate instead of a judge in a habeas corpus hearing was acceptable because
the proceeding had been electronically recorded.' The Court, however, ruled
that the judge's listening to the recording was not the equivalent of his
personally hearing and observing witnesses.7 8
Finally, the due process problem in the Maryland master system is not
mitigated, according to the Swisher dissent, by the fact that the juvenile may
submit additional evidence to the judge when the state takes exception to the
master's finding, because the state may refuse to agree to the supplementation
of the record and thus thwart the juvenile's efforts.79 Even more important, in
Justice Marshall's view, is that when a juvenile seeks to reopen the proceeding
before the judge - to avoid having the case decided against him on the basis of a
cold record in violation of the due process clause - he is being subjected to a
second trial of the sort prohibited by the double jeopardy clause."
C.

The Balancing Test and an Administrative Law Analogy

No authority on juvenile matters suggests that it is beneficial to the juvenile
to come before a master in the first instance instead of a judge, or to have his
case subjected to rehearing if exception is taken by the State. On the contrary,
judges, 8 ' legislators, 8 and commissions on juvenile matters" have urged the

175. 418 U.S. 461 (1974).
176. The Wingo Court was concerned with the current version, 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1971),
of the habeas corpus statute considered in Holiday. See note 170 supra.
177. 418 U.S. at 465-67.
178. Id. at 473-74. One commentator has argued that even the use of videotape is not
an adequate substitute for live testimony. Brakel, Videotape in Trial Proceedings: A
Technological Obsession?, 61 A.B.A.J. 956, 957 (1975).
179. 438 U.S. at 232. See MD. R.P. 911(c).
180. 438 U.S. at 232. "The constitutionality of forcing a juvenile to such a choice
between fundamental rights is questionable at best." Id. (citations omitted).
181. See REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON JUVENILE AND FAMILY LAW AND PROCEDURE TO
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 1 (1976).
182. See MD. H.B. 1180 (1978); MD. S.B. 662 (1978); MD.H.B. 1588 (1977); MD. H.J.
REs. 84 (1977); MD. H.B. 691 (1977).
183. See FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE TO THE GOVERNOR AND
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND 12 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT];
INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. AMERICAN BAR ASs'N, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT,
COURT ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION
COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS
PREVENTION,
PREVENTION

REPORT

OF

282 (1976).

THE

TASK

21 (Tent. Draft 1977); 1

NATIONAL ADVISORY

AND GOALS, JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY

FORCE

ON

JUVENILE

JUSTICE

AND

DELINQUENCY
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abolition of the master system, finding it destructive of the aims of the juvenile
courts."' Thus, the only element of the Court's "balancing test " Imthat could be
invoked in support of the system is the administrative concern introduced in
Breed. It might indeed be suggested that administrative law provides a model
for separation of decisionmaking from hearing of evidence. In the work of
administrative agencies the "institutional decision" is common.
In the administrative process, evidence may be taken before an examiner,
the examiner or other subordinates may sift the evidence, various kinds of
specialists of the agency's staff may contribute to the writing of the initial
or recommended decision, and the agency heads may in fact lean so heavily
on the work of the staff as to know little or nothing about the problems
involved in many of the cases decided in the agency's name.'
The examiner, or "administrative law judge" as he is now called, performs
functions similar to those of the juvenile court master' 87 "An agency loses no
power of decision by having an administrative law judge preside at a hearing,"8
and courts reviewing administrative decisions ordinarily review the agency's
decision, not the administrative law judge's.'89 Although recent decisions have
made it clear that the agency cannot simply disregard the judge's findings," and
may even have overturned the old rule that deciding officers were not to be
examined to determine how and why decisions were made, 9' the subordinate

184. One report stated:
More than any other factor, the use of masters in the juvenile courts is seen by the
Commission as a major problem in the present system, according a lower level of
justice and consideration to children in the State, and lessening the court's credibility
and image.
The Masters System not only evidences a "second class" status for juvenile causes,
but is extremely inefficient, causing delays and duplication of work. The Commission
acknowledges that there are many fine masters who would make good judges, but the
problem is that they are not judges.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 183, at 12.
185. See text accompanying notes 143 to 154 supra.
186. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 226 (3d ed. 1972).
187. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES §§ 10.00-.04 (1976 & Cum.
Supp. 1977).
188. K. DAVIS, supra note 187, § 10.03 (1976) (paraphrasing the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1974)).
189. See K. DAVIs, supra note 187, § 10.04 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
190. See Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 224, 246-48 (5th Cir. 1976); ITT Continental Baking Co. v. FTC, 532 F.2d 207, 219
(2d Cir. 1976) (dictum); NLRB v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 526 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1975);
Local 441, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 510 F.2d 1274, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
191. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Montrose
Chem. Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But the requirement that the
administrative law judge who initially decides the issue must have heard the evidence, 5
U.S.C. § 554(d) (1974), has been upheld. Gamble Skagmo, Inc. v. FTC, 211 F.2d 106, 113
(8th Cir. 1954).
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role of the administrative law judge remains analogous to that of the master. He
conducts hearings and "proposes" findings to decisionmakers, who very often
decide in accord with his findings after the most cursory examination of his
reports. 92
While this analogy is formally appealing, there is no difficulty in seeing
that its real force is not to make the acceptability of the master system more
plausible, but to suggest that such a system belongs in a different context.
Administrative agencies adjudicate only civil, not criminal, matters. A great
part of their work is routine; they must rely on the advice of specialists; and
their very large volume of business makes delegation to subordinate officers
necessary.'93 The cost accounting suggested in Breed" may be properly employed
in organizing the agencies' systems of adjudication. The juvenile court, on the
other hand, has often to decide the liberty of individuals. To place that court
outside the tradition of criminal law that insists upon face-to-face confrontation
for reliable factfinding, to oblige it to depend upon "[tirials-by-transcript [which]
can never be more than trials by substantial evidence,"'95 is almost to pretend
that it is a kind of administrative agency, shielded from due process standards
by its civil label. If the administrative concerns expressed in Breed must be met,
it should be by procedures that do not offend the fundamental right to "due
process and fair treatment."'

192. See K. DAVIS, supra note 186, at 233-34.
193. Id. at 232-34.
194. See notes 148 to 153 and accompanying text supra.
195. Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. at 231-32 & n.ll (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
Amicus Brief of State Public Defender of California). See text accompanying notes 155 to
180 supra. See also note 55 supra.
196. 438 U.S. at 236 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In addition to its procedural
shortcomings, the master system may suffer from a failure to provide equal protection to
juveniles because it is excluded by state law from two Maryland counties. Such
non-uniformity of judicial authority is permitted by the Maryland Constitution: "The
District Court shall have the original jurisdiction prescribed by law. Jurisdiction of the
District Court shall be uniform throughout the State; except that in Montgomery County
and other counties and the City of Baltimore, the Court may have such jurisdiction over
juvenile cases as is provided by law." MD. CONST. art. IV, § 41(a). This in turn authorizes
the statutory provisions for Montgomery County, MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.

§ 1-604 (1980): "Two of the IDistrict Ijudges in district 6 IMontgomery Countyl shall have as
their primary duty and, ifmade necessary by the case load their exclusive duty, the handlingof
juvenile causes;" and Prince George's County, id. § 3-813, which provides in part: "AfterJuly 1,
1978 thejudges of the Circuit Court of Prince George's County may not appoint or continue the
appointment of masters forjuvenile causes."
That the state does not mandate the appointment of masters in counties where
they are permitted does not alter the fact that territorial discrimination exists, since
masters are forbidden elsewhere. It is well established that legislative

territorial

classifications are not necessarily prohibited by the federal equal protection clause, see
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426-27 (1961); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545,
550 (1954); Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1880); In re Trader, 272 Md. 364, 383-92,
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CONCLUSION

The Swisher Court limited itself to analysis on narrow procedural grounds
in deciding that the state's taking exceptions to a master's proposed findings
does not subject the juvenile to a second trial. Concluding that the two hearings,
before the master and the judge, form one unbroken proceeding and that the

325 A.2d 398, 403 (1974), and the test for such classifications is whether there is a rational
basis for them.
"Maryland has long followed the practice of enacting local laws affecting only
certain counties, or exempting particular counties or localities from the operation of
general laws or some of the provisions thereof." In re Trader, 272 Md. 364, 383, 325 A.2d
398, 408 (1974) (citations omitted). The Court of Appeals has applied the rational basis
test to require merely that "any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would
sustain [the classification]." Id. at 391, 325 A.2d at 402. The burden of proof that no such
state of facts exists has been placed upon the challenger of the classification. Id. at 391-92,
325 A.2d at 413.
The Supreme Court has made it clear, on the other hand, that where fundamental
rights are infringed by a classification the state law must be "shown to be necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest," Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634
(1969) (emphasis in original), in order to be upheld. Note, StrengtheningEqual Protection
Analysis in Maryland: Territorial Classificationand In re Trader, 35 MD. L. REv. 312,
322-23 (1975). To date, no Maryland law has been struck down because of this doctrine.
It is unlikely that the Court will find a violation of fundamental rights and apply
this strict test to an equal protection challenge to the master system - unlikely, but
perhaps not impossible. Inasmuch as the Court already applies a balancing test to juvenile
due process rights, see text accompanying notes 131 to 152 supra, it might conceivably
happen that the Court would find the master system barely acceptable - perhaps for
administrative reasons, see notes 146 to 152 and accompanying text supra - under that
test, but consider it to "infringe" far enough upon fundamental rights that strict scrutiny
would be appropriate for a classification based on the system.
As to the "rational basis" test, a strong indication that the system could survive it
is provided by In re Trader, 272 Md. 364, 325 A.2d 398 (1974), which involved four cases in
which juveniles challenged on equal protection grounds a law affording different
treatment to juveniles tried in Montgomery County than to those tried elsewhere in the
state. The provisions of a general statute and of the one applicable only in the single
county differed primarily as to the ages of juveniles over whom waiver of juvenile
jurisdiction was allowed and the immediate appealability of a trial court's waiver order.
The general statute contained an exemption from juvenile jurisdiction that the local one
did not. See id. at 369-71, 325 A.2d at 401-02. The equal protection challenges were
rejected in three of the cases - two involving the appealability of the waiver order and one
the exception from juvenile jurisdiction - because no evidence had been presented to
demonstrate lack of a reasonable basis for the different treatment and because neither of
the differences was "so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory on its face." Id. at
401, 325 A.2d at 417; see id. at 401-02, 403, 325 A.2d at 418-19. The Court of Appeals,
after holding that the strict standard of review was not called for because fundamental
rights were not significantly affected, id. at 395-97, 325 A.2d at 475-76, said of the
difference in the provisions for review of waiver orders:
That the decision of a juvenile court to waive its jurisdiction is a matter of critical
importance to the juvenile . . . does not compel the conclusion that no rational basis
could possibly exist for a legislative determination limiting the right of immediate
review of waiver orders in all but one county of the State .

. .

. [C]onstitutionality is

presumed in the absence of a clear and convincing showing by the party assailing the
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master, despite his considerable factfinding powers, is not an adjudicator, the
Court allowed the continuance of a juvenile court system markedly different in
its two-tiered structure from adult criminal courts. While the decision will apply
to juvenile courts in many states,"7 it neither settled finally the question of the
extent of double jeopardy protection available to juveniles nor addressed the
adequacy of other due process protections afforded by master systems such as
Maryland's.
After the sweeping introduction of due process standards into juvenile
courts announced in Gault,9 8 the Court has preferred to examine particular due
process rights on narrow grounds, and has increasingly given weight to
considerations other than constitutional rights in deciding whether to recognize
the rights as applicable to juveniles. Although in the McKeiver plurality
opinion' 9 such considerations were found sufficient to deny the right to trial by
jury, in both Winship"' and Breed?"° the list of constitutional protections begun
by Gault was extended. In Swisher the Court had the opportunity to extend
Breed by recognizing that the Maryland master system operated in de facto
violation of double jeopardy. It chose instead to ignore substance and to permit
the state to evade the constitutional requirement by giving suitable formal
labels to components of its juvenile court system. This choice made plain the
difference, in the Court's view, between juvenile and criminal procedural
requirements. Far from applying any real balancing test, the Court in effect left
the question of double jeopardy protection under the master system to the
legislature.
It is not only with respect to double jeopardy that the present Maryland
master system is deficient. The system appears to violate the Constitution in
another way: the judge's reliance on the cold record of a master's hearing does
not make possible sufficiently reliable factfinding to satisfy the Winship
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Perhaps the former deficiency
could be remedied by prohibiting the state from taking exceptions to a master's
proposed findings; the latter, by permitting either party to demand a hearing in
the first instance before a judge.'m But such tinkering would not reach the heart

legislative classification that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is
essentially arbitrary.
Id. at 399-400, 325 A.2d at 477 (citations omitted). From this it is evident how minimal is
the Maryland rational basis test. It is worth noting that the Court of Special Appeals had
found the denial of immediate appeal "arbitrary, unreasonably discriminatory and
unrelated to any legitimate state objective." Id. at 374, 325 A.2d at 403 (quoting In re
Trader, 20 Md. App. 1, 9, 315 A.2d 528, 534 (1974)). Accordingly, it is difficult to see how a
challenge to the master system based upon the equal protection clause could succeed. It
has been argued that the Court of Appeals may be ready to consider a strengthened
rational basis test. See Note, supra.
197.
198.
199.
200.

See
See
See
See

note 75 supra.
text accompanying notes 52 to 55 supra.
text accompanying notes 58 to 67 supra.
text accompanying notes 56 to 57 supra.

201. See text accompanying notes 68 to 72 supra.
202. See note 75 supra.
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of the problem, which is that the state, for reasons of cost, imposes second-class
status in the courts upon juveniles charged with crimes. The best course of
action for the Maryland legislature would be to abolish the juvenile master
system.2

203. If the master system is abolished, it has been suggested that some of the masters
could be appointed to juvenile court judgeships or given other positions within the court
system. FINAL REPORT, supra note 183, at 13. One report stated that thirteen additional
judgeships would be needed to replace the master system, and that the total cost to provide
full judicial coverage would be only 25% more than the cost of the master system. Id. at 14.

